An anarchist guide to ... Europe by Ruth Kinna (1252950)
  
An Anarchist Guide to Europe 
Ruth Kinna 
What do anarchists have to say about Europe? The answer is nothing that speaks directly to the recent, tedious 
and crudely self-serving debates about the European Union and the rights and wrongs of membership, but quite 
a lot about some of the issues that have animated these clashes: trade, democracy, movements of peoples, 
nationality, principles of justice and well-being. There are three major lines of thought, each extending from a 
critique of European state practice, which together support an alternative vision of organising.  The first is about 
anarchy and the United States of Europe. The second is about European imperialism. The third is about 
Europeanisation. 
 
The United States of Europe 
In the light of Chomsky's exposures of the corruption of republican ideas under the influence of finance capital, it 
seems odd to find that an anarchist – Bakunin, no less – spoke warmly about the United States of America and 
the prospect of a United States of Europe. What on earth did he mean?  
Bakunin represented America as a model for a federal Europe. The American federal system, he argued, reflected 
a popular desire for self-government. Having fought a revolutionary war, American citizens were keen to secure 
themselves from the tyranny of monarchism and colonialism. The decision to unite as federal units was an 
expression of their aspiration for freedom.  
Bakunin was under no illusion about the character of American revolutionary aspirations or the interests that 
prevailed when they were given institutional expression. It was no accident that the defence of federalism was 
more pronounced in the South than it was in the North or that the demand to be rid of tyranny was measured by 
the latitude individuals enjoyed to exercise their mastership over others: federalism was entirely compatible with 
slavery and, later anarchists added, systematic violence against indigenous peoples. Federalism also provided a 
foundation for the normalisation of wage slavery, though Bakunin considered that the class divisions that were so 
evident in Europe were less pronounced in 1860s America.  
Making up for the shortcomings of the American model, Bakunin imagined that the United States of Europe 
would socialise property and anarchise governance. This conception of a federal system fuelled the revolutionary 
ambitions that eventually found expression in 1871, in the Paris Commune. Though the Commune was brutally 
crushed, it highlighted the difference between the idea of United States of Europe and the reality of United States 
of America. The latter was merely a federative state: a system that united territorialised, sovereign units, limiting 
their spheres of action by the imposition of a constitution that was protected by a central authority. Bakunin's 
comrade James Guillaume noticed that in a federal state, individual units were forbidden from leaving the 
federation, even forbidden from subdividing to form new, separate units. What was forbidden was not impossible 
– but illegal and thus fixed and constrained by constitutional law (or treaty). Stretching revolutionary principles of 
self-government, the peoples of the United States of Europe would not only abandon individual property rights 
but also pursue Proudhonian principles of free agreement to de-territorialise decision-making and attack the 
state. The power of the sovereign, both within and between the constitutive units would be eliminated. Each 
would rely only on the collective power arising from their federation to protect their constitutional principles and 
arrangements.   
 
Europe and imperialism 
 
Like most socialists, anarchists decried imperialist adventures in the non-European world and the appropriation of 
vast tracts of it. Because anarchists didn't subscribe to theses of progressive historical change, they were also 
largely immune to the argument that colonialism was a route to capitalist collapse and therefore a justifiable cost 
of human progress – a view adopted by some Marxists. Colonisation was domination, driven by exploitation and 
underpinned by assumptions of cultural superiority.  
As well as looking at the ways that European domination played out, anarchists also looked at the dynamics of 
European state formation. The argument was that all states operated in the same way. In hock to banks, elites 
secured control of local populations through a mixture of force and fraud constructing the state through 
processes of colonisation and monopoly. However, these processes of formation were not identical and states 
followed what modern historical sociologists refer to as more-or-less coercive or capitalist-intensive paths. At the 
absolutist end of the spectrum, elites used overtly repressive techniques to extract resources from majority rural 
populations and force military service through conscription. At the liberal end, they relied on deals with property 
owners and the law to achieve the same result from increasingly urban populations. The uneven development of 
European states explained the competitive nature of the state system and the increasingly top-down nationalistic 
policies that states pursued in their battles for prestige. In the late nineteenth century, Britain was the dominant 
imperial power in Europe, but France and Germany continuously jostled for primacy on the continent. The enmity 
was exposed in the 1870 Franco-Prussian war and again in 1914, in spite of the best efforts of the socialist Second 
International to broker peace deals and forge European union.  
According to this analysis, the early European unity projects which fed into the EEC/EU are based on a 
fundamental tension. While 'ever greater union' normalised capitalist relations, extended liberal representative 
systems of government and suspended hostilities between major European states, the it also reaffirmed the 
primacy of states and left mechanisms for European exploitation and domination intact. Bringing former rivals 
together through elite bargaining, this United States of Europe has no collective power, as Guillaume understood 
it, but still attracts the loathing of nationalists and patriots who feel aggrieved by the apparent loss of sovereignty 
and national standing. Union reaffirms the special value of European civilisation by attaching it to ideals of peace, 
civil liberties, pluralism and democracy, simultaneously reinforcing political and cultural ties with those non-
European states that it most resembles and opening up paths to grass-roots cooperation and sharing across the 
continent and beyond. But it cannot transcend the centripetal forces active within states which speak nostalgically 
of the majesty of national traditions, bemoan the dilution of national character and the fetters that Union places 
on the pursuit of naked self-interest.  
 
Europeanisation 
Nineteenth century anarchists didn't use the language of globalisation to think about the extension of European 
power in the world, but developed an approach to what was called internationalisation to reflect on the role 
Europeans had played in developing global interconnections. Like globalisation, internationalisation was used by 
non-anarchists descriptively to advance normative arguments for the extension of free trade across the globe, on 
terms that advantaged industrial and manufacturing states. Advocates of internationalisation argued about the 
extent to which trade could or should be regulated for the sake of general well-being, but there was general 
agreement that there was no changing the prevailing processes. Naturally, anarchists challenged this claim and 
offered alternatives based on the global extension of the federal principle. Their vision was genuinely inter-
nationalist insofar as it was anti-statist and designed to support solidarities between different ethnic, religious 
and language groups from the bottom-up.   
Anarchists argued that Europeanisation paralleled internationalisation and that it was circular and degenerative 
process – not linear or progressive as nationalist cultural champions contended. Europe was a hegemon, Elisée 
Reclus argued. Punching well above its weight in terms of its control of the earth's resources and its global reach 
(to the Americas, Australia, New Zealand) it was the centre of the world, and more extensive than either Greece or 
Rome had been in the earlier periods.  But rather than simply extending European influence in the non-European 
world, Europeans appropriated ideas from the regions they explored, mapped, colonised and conquered and fed 
them back under their own cultural banners. Europeans learned a lot in the process. In Egypt, the near East and 
India, Reclus said, the daughter rediscovered its mother. But Europeanisation undermined the potential to 
facilitate the sharing of knowledges across the globe. In fact, by supporting internationalisation through 
Europeanisation, Europeans tainted and corrupted the shared and overlapping values which they re-packaged 
and attempted to universalise. The end result has been the creation of cultural barriers and the erection of 
political and trade boundaries designed to protect the achievements, talent and ingenuity of those inside the 
continent and excluding the dangerous, uncivilised peoples without (unless, of course, they are able to 
demonstrate that they meet some special designated purpose and are able to demonstrate their respect for 
British/French/European values).  
Camillo Berneri and Colin Ward both pointed to the principle of decentralised federalism as one of the distinctive 
ideas to emerge from historical anarchism and argued that this horizontal organisational principle was wrapper 
for a broad critique of the state. The anarchist proposal was built on a novel understanding of the essential 
instability of the state system, its global structural inequalities and the drivers it created for mass movements of 
peoples. In this context, it's possible to see that Bakunin's proposal for a United States of Europe was not at all 
prophetic. It outlined some possibilities for Europe's transformation. 
